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ABSTRACT
I study a model where Information Technology, while typically increasing
overall inequality, is likely to harm some people at intermediate and high lev-
els of the distribution of income but to benefit people at the bottom. Within
a given occupation it may harm some workers while benefitting others; and
it may either reduce or increase the proportion of knowledge workers in em-
ployment. In my model, knowledge (in a broad sense) is an input into the
production function of human capital, and is also a ”quality” good in the
sense that one cannot buy it from several low-quality producers instead of
one high-quality one. People differ in their exogenous ability and ability is
complementary with the quality of the knowledge input in the production
of human capital. An improvement in IT is modelled as an increase in the
number of people who can buy knowledge from one producer. I show that
the economy organizes itself in a succession of clusters of ability levels, called
”knowledge ladders”, where a member of a given ladder buys knowledge from
a worker in the subsequent ladder and sells it to a worker of the preceding
ladder. The return to human capital increases as one moves up the knowl-
edge ladder. The economic mechanism considered here rests on the view that
IT makes the acquisition of knowledge cheaper, which intensifies competi-
tion among workers specialized in knowledge production. Those who lose in
such competition end up displaced to occupations with a lower knowledge
intensity; their wages fall, which reduces inequality between them and the
least skilled. Those who win can spread their ability over a larger market
and because of that enjoy a larger increase in wages than the least skilled,
which tends to increase inequality. The least skilled do not participate in
this competition, as they are not specialized in knowledge production; they
gain in absolute terms because of their cheaper access to knowledge.
JEL: J3, I2, O3, O4
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Skilled-biased technical change, especially the diffusion of computers and in-
formation technology, is widely believed to be responsible for the observed
rise in inequality and the fall in living standards at the bottom of the earn-
ings distribution.1 The idea is that unskilled production workers can be
advantageously substituted by skilled workers using computers. Yet direct
evidence about this mechanism is quite mixed2. On the one hand, there exist
industry-level studies that suggest a positive correlation between the use of
computers and the demand for skilled workers at the industry level.3 On the
other hand, plant level evidence sometimes contradicts this view4, or sug-
gests that this does not seem to be the case for many other ITs 5; and results
that showed a positive, causal impact of computer use on wages have been
challenged6. It is also sometimes argued that substitution of non production
to production workers has typically led, not followed, the IT revolution7.
This paper studies a model where the effect of IT is far more complex
than usually assumed. It is shown that IT, while typically increasing overall
inequality, is likely to harm some people at intermediate and high levels of
the distribution of income but to benefit people at the bottom; that within
a given occupation it may harm some workers while benefitting others; and
that it may either reduce or increase the proportion of knowledge workers in
employment, depending on the response of the overall demand for knowledge
1For statements of this view, see Krueger (1993), Bound and Johnson (1992), OECD
(1994), Krugman (1994), Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997)
2A critical survey can be found in Howell et al. (1998).
3Berndt et al. (1992), Berman et al. (1994), Autor et al. (1996), who typically point
out that IT is associated with upskilling and an increase in the share of nonproduction
employment.
4Cappelli (1993).
5See Doms et al. (1997).
6See the critique of Krueger (1993) by DiNardo and Pischke (1997) and Entorf et al.
(1999). Doms et al. (1997) do not find an impact on wage differentials of computerization.
7Howell (1997) argues that the rise in the ratio of non-production to production workers
highlighted by Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) stops in 1983, while Gordon (1996)
finds that the share of non production workers ends up declining after 1985.
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to the implied reduction in the cost of acquiring it.
The central economic mechanism considered here is quite different from
the idea that computers are substitute for unskilled workers; it rests on the
view that IT makes the acquisition of knowledge cheaper, which intensi-
fies competition among workers specialized in knowledge production. Those
who lose in such competition end up displaced to occupations with a lower
knowledge intensity; their wages fall, which reduces inequality between them
and the least skilled. Those who win can spread their ability over a larger
market (as in Rosen (1981,1982)) and because of that enjoy a larger increase
in wages than the least skilled, which tends to increase inequality. The least
skilled do not participate in this competition, as they are not specialized in
knowledge production; they gain in absolute terms because of their cheaper
access to knowledge.
In my model, knowledge (in a broad sense) is an input into the production
function of human capital, and is also a ”quality” good in the sense that
one cannot buy it from several low-quality producers instead of one high-
quality one. This latter property plays a key role in the results, by allowing
IT to differentially affect the wages of people who produce the same good
(knowledge) but have different skills. People differ in their exogenous ability
and ability is complementary with the quality of the knowledge input in the
production of human capital.
I show that the economy organizes itself in a succession of clusters of
ability levels, called ”knowledge ladders”, where a member of a given ladder
buys knowledge from a worker in the subsequent ladder and sells it to a
worker of the preceding ladder. The return to human capital increases as
one moves up the knowledge ladder.
Next I consider the impact of an improvement in information technology,
which is modelled as a reduction in the number of people from whom one has
to buy knowledge. I show that such a shift increases the gap in the rate of
return to human capital between two consecutive ladders, and at the same
time leads to a displacement of the least able workers within each ladder to
3
the inferior one. Another central result is that while an improvement in IT
may increase wages for all worker types in the long run, its impact effect
is to reduce wages for some workers who are displaced to lower knowledge
levels. Those at the lowest level, i.e. direct production workers, gain in
terms of absolute wages as they have access to a cheaper knowledge input.
They experience a relative loss with respect to knowledge workers who are
not displaced to a lower level, but a gain with respect to those who are
displaced.
These wage effects are consistent with Mishel and Bernstein’s (1994) find-
ing that IT actually equalize wages at the bottom of the distribution of in-
come, while increasing inequality at the top. There also exists some direct
evidence that IT displaces workers at fairly high income levels. Cooke (2000),
who specifically looks at prospects for workers in the IT industry, argues
that ”[while] companies are offering above average compensation packages
to attract skilled IT workers, other IT workers risk being replaced by new
technologies or simply a more efficient labor market”. Further below, she
states that ”in the past, for example, IT occupations related to mainframe-
oriented processing such as keypunch operators, were eliminated or redefined
as the technology evolved towards network-based, client-server computing.
In recent years, computer operators that monitor and maintain large com-
puter systems have begun to be replaced by self-monitoring, low maintenance
systems.” Similarly, Veneri (1998), reports a stagnation in the demand for
computer programmers despite the explosion of computer use. This is pre-
sumably due to increased standardization and portability of programs, so
that only the best programmers have kept their jobs. Interestingly, she also
reports that the wages of programmers grow at about the same (high) rate
as other IT professions. It is also known that in the nineties, white-collar
workers were more exposed to displacement than in earlier decades.8
The paper is related to several strands of theoretical literature. One
strand has insisted on ”span of control” effects, the increasing returns they
8See American Management Association (2000).
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generate, and their implications for the distribution of income and the allo-
cation of talent. This includes Calvo and Wellisz (1979), Rosen (1981,1982),
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Garicano (2000). This type of effect
is also key to the present paper, which differs from this literature in many
respects, in particular in that it focuses on information technology and the
organization of the labor market in successive knowledge ladders. Another
strand is interested in the role of technologies that are more intensive in hu-
man capital (Acemoglu (1999), Zeira (1998), Caselli (1998), Galor and Moav
(1998), Rubinstein and Tsiddon (1998), Beaudry and Green (2000)). The
present paper differs from that strand in that rather than assuming a change
in key elasticities of the production function, it explicitly recognizes, using
a single production function, that improvements in IT allows knowledge to
be spread over more people. Hence the technical change that we consider is
not skilled biased by construction; rather, its effect on inequality is a gen-
eral equilibrium consequence of the easier replicability of symbols and of the
importance of knowledge quality.
Closer in spirit is the paper by Saint-Paul (2001). In both cases, knowl-
edge is an indivisible good which is more valued by more productive agents.
In Saint-Paul (2001), however, knowledge is a spillover exerted by creative
people within networks. An improvement in IT increases these spillovers,
in such a way that the poorest workers cannot be harmed; furthermore in-
equality goes up and then down as IT improves.9 Here, knowledge is traded,
and an improvement in IT induces people to buy knowledge from fewer, but
better people, which redistributes from ”stars” to ”superstars”. The over-
all impact on inequality is similar to my previous paper, but the economic
mechanism analyzed here is quite different. Furthermore, the present model
captures the previously ignored phenomenon of worker displacement between
knowledge ladders.
The next section sets up the basic model, which is an overlapping genera-
tions model of human capital accumulation, where in order to acquire human
9See Saint-Paul (2001) for details.
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capital one needs to buy knowledge of some quality from members of the pre-
vious generation. . Section 3 studies steady state equilibria, while section 4
analyzes transitional dynamics toward the steady state. Section 5 deals with
two extensions. First, it allows the demand for knowledge to be elastic to its
cost by assuming that some workers can ’opt out’ of the knowledge economy
by not acquiring human capital. Second, it shows how the model can be
extended to take balanced growth into account, and analyzes the impact of
population growth and productivity growth on the distribution of income.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Model set-up
We consider an overlapping generation, open economy which can borrow and
lend at a fixed real interest rate r. For notational simplicity we shall assume
r = 0. People live for two periods. The size of each cohort is fixed and
normalized to one.
In the first period of their life, the young train themselves by buying
knowledge. This determines their human capital. In the second period of
their life they work and consume. They can either work in the production
sector or sell knowledge to the next generation of young.
The young generation’s agents differ in innate ability g. It is distributed
over [0,+∞) with a Poisson distribution. Its density is given by
f(g) = γe−γg. (1)
In order to acquire human capital, a young worker must buy knowledge
from a fraction s of an old worker, where s < 1. If b∗ is the human capital of
that knowledge supplier, the young worker’s human capital is given by the
following human capital production function:
b = Beλgb∗α, (2)
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where B,λ, and α are positive constants. Furthermore, α < 1, so that the
human capital production function exhibits decreasing marginal returns to
the knowledge supplier’s human capital.
This specification implies that knowledge is not a homogeneous input: it
has to be bought from exactly s people. One cannot substitute two mediocre
teachers for a good one. Furthermore, knowledge is assumed to be comple-
mentary with ability: people with greater ability get a higher marginal return
from increasing the skills of the people from whom they learn.
s captures the efficiency of information technology. The smaller s, the
lower the working time of an old knowledge supplier that is needed in order
to train one young worker–i.e. the greater the number of people who can
use one person’s knowledge.
We shall assume that γ > λ, which makes sure that the cross-sectional
moments of productivity are well defined.
In the production sector, which is perfectly competitive, the production
function is linear and given by
Y = AH,
where H is the aggregate amount of human capital employed in that sector.
Consequently, an old agent of human capital b who works in the production
sector produces an output equal to Ab. Contrary to what occurs in the knowl-
edge sector, human capital enters in a homogeneous way in the production of
physical output. In that sector, the same aggregate amount of human capital
can be obtained by hiring a few high-skill workers or many low-skill workers.
Literally speaking, this is a model of human capital accumulation over
the life cycle by successive cohorts. At a more metaphorical level, however,
it may also apply to higher frequency phenomena and be used to understand
the economy-wide organization of production. b would then more broadly
interpreted as a set of intangible, intermediate inputs (organizational skills,
ideas, supervision, information, etc.) that allow to boost productivity in the
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final goods sector.10
The questions we are interested in are the following: how does the equilib-
rium distribution of human capital look like? How are knowledge producers
assigned to knowledge consumers? Who specializes in knowledge produc-
tion? What is the distribution of income? How does a change in s affect
these parameters?
These characteristics are represented by an equilibrium wage schedule
ω(b), an equilibrium distribution of skills represented by a function b(g) which
tells us what is the human capital of an agent with ability g, and an equilib-
rium pair of knowledge assignment functions b∗(g) (resp. g∗(g)), which tell
us about the human capital (resp. ability) of the agent from whom a young
agent with skill g buys knowledge. We now analyze the equilibrium values
of these functions.
3 Steady state
We first characterize a steady state where these functions are invariant over
time. In this case, we must have:
b(g∗(.)) ≡ b∗(.). (3)




Assuming that ω(.) is locally differentiable, the first-order condition is11
ω0(Beλgbα)αBeλgbα−1 = sω0(b). (5)
10One may argue that in such a case an infinite horizon framework would be more
appropriate. However, Bewley (1980) and Townsend (1980) have developed models of
imperfect access to credit markets whose structure is quite similar to OLG models.
11It turns out that the equilibrium wage schedule we construct is not differentiable at
its critical points. In such a case, however, it is right- and left- differentiable, and the




Our central result is that depending on parameter values, the economy
can be in one of two regimes. In regime I all workers are indifferent between
knowledge production and output production. In regime II workers are en-
tirely specialized in knowledge production above some ability level, and a
knowledge ”chain” arises in a way made clear below.
Let us first describe the equilibrium in regime I.




−1 ≥ α γ(1−α)λ . (6)
and
α ≥ s
then there exists a steady state such that
(i) The wage schedule is given by ω(b) = Ab,∀b
(ii) All knowledge workers are indifferent between knowledge production
and output production.
(iii) The knowledge assignment function g∗(g) is given by




























where the R and L subscripts denote the right and left derivatives, respectively.
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PROOF — See Appendix.
If γ(1−α)/λ ≤ 1, then condition (6) is always satisfied and regime I holds
for all s ≤ α. In the more interesting case when γ(1− α)/λ > 1, it holds for
s ∈ [α γ(1−α)γ(1−α)−λ ,α].
In this regime, knowledge producers are always indifferent between knowl-
edge and goods production. The marginal return to human capital is constant
throughout the distribution of skills and equal to A, its marginal productivity
in the output sector. The explanation is as follows. At a constant marginal
return to human capital equal to A, workers with ability g want to purchase
knowledge from workers with ability g∗(g). The density of workers around
g∗(g) is larger than s times the density of workers around g. In other words,
there are more than enough workers willing to supply the amount of knowl-
edge demanded by workers with ability g. Consequently, in equilibrium these
workers must be indifferent between supplying knowledge or working in the
production sector, which implies that the marginal return to human capital
is pinned down by the production sector. This validates the assumption that
it is equal to A.





, the demand for knowledge workers is zero. Therefore,
these workers are entirely specialized in production, earning also A.
An improvement in information technology, i.e. a reduction in s, shifts
the distribution of human capital, and therefore income, homothetically. All
worker types earn more and relative inequality is unchanged. This is because
while people buy knowledge from more able workers, there is a ”reserve
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army” of knowledge suppliers at marginal cost sA at any skill level, since a
positive fraction of any skill type works in the production sector. Therefore,
the demand shift in favor of higher quality knowledge suppliers is matched
by a corresponding movement from production to knowledge among high
quality workers, without any change in wages.12 At the same time the least





) become entirely specialized in production.
The next proposition describes the more interesting regime where some
ability levels are entirely specialized in knowledge production.13




Then there exists a steady state such that







(ii) There exists a sequence of critical ability levels (g0, g1, ...., gi, ....) such
that
a. gi = −i/γ ln s, implying g0 = 0.
b. people such that 0 ≤ g ≤ g1 are entirely specialized in the production
of physical output
c. people such that gi ≤ g ≤ gi+1 are entirely specialized in knowledge pro-
duction. They sell knowledge to workers in [gi−1, gi] and buy it from workers
in [gi+1, gi+2]
12It is easy to check that for g ≥ 1−αλ ln αs , a constant fraction s(1−α)γ/λ−1α(1−α)γ/λ of
workers at any skill level g are specialized in knowledge production.
13Note that we do not characterize equilibria for α < ē. This is because the analytics
become untractable. Results from a similar partial equilibrium model, however, suggest
that for α < ē workers buy knowledge from less able people
11
















(v) Over the interval [b(gi), b(gi+1)] wages are given by
ω(b) = $i +Ak
i(b− b(gi)),
where ωi = Aki, $i can be recursively computed as






γ(1−α)−1 > 1 . (12)
PROOF — See Appendix.
Regime II holds if γ(1− α)/λ > 1 and s ∈ [0,α γ(1−α)γ(1−α)−λ ). Hence it tends
to prevail for more efficient information technologies than regime I. As s
becomes low, the agents of an economy in regime I try to buy knowledge from
workers with an ever greater quality relative to themselves, and eventually
bump into a supply constraint for quality workers.14 This pushes up the
14This sentence is only valid in the case of interest where γ(1 − α)/λ > 1. Otherwise,
regime II never arises even for arbitrarily small values of s. The reason is as follows. As
s falls, there is a race between two effects. First, people attempt to buy knowledge from
higher quality workers, who are scarcer. Second, they need to purchase knowledge from
fewer people. If γ(1−α)/λ < 1, then the second effect dominates, so that there are always
more than enough workers of a given quality to match the demand for knowledge suppliers
at this quality. Consequently, the economy remains in regime I throughout as s falls to
zero.
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marginal price of human capital for high quality workers, so that the economy
must now be in a regime where the wage schedule is no longer linear.
Proposition 2 tells us that the economy then organizes itself into a ”knowl-
edge chain”, i.e. a sequence of adjacent intervals of skill levels such that in
any interval each worker buys knowledge from a previous generation’s worker
of the next interval and sells it to a worker of the next generation in the
preceding interval, while workers at the lowest interval of skills [0, g1] are
entirely specialized in output production.
The wage schedule is piece-wise linear and convex, as illustrated on Figure
1; the marginal return to human capital is increasing as one moves up the
distribution of skills, i.e. as one’s position in the knowledge chain is more
remote from direct productive activity. As one moves up one ladder in the
knowledge chain the marginal return to human capital increases by a factor
k, where k is given by (12), and, importantly, greater than one. In the (g,ω)
plane, the wage schedule is piece-wise exponential, i.e., log wages are again
piece-wise linear (Figure 1).
Hence the marginal return to human capital goes up as one moves up
the distribution of skills. This is because the marginal willingness to pay
for knowledge tend to accumulate as one moves up the knowledge chain; i.e.
the marginal willingness to pay of a given worker for an improvement in the
quality of his knowledge input is proportional to his own marginal return to
human capital. If the worker is specialized in knowledge, this marginal return
itself reflects the marginal willingness to pay for knowledge quality of workers
in the preceding ladder, and so on. This cumulative effect is reflected in the
ki factor in (11). k captures the marginal willingness to pay for knowledge
quality relative to one’s marginal return to human capital.
As is also illustrated on figure 1, the human capital acquisition function
b(g) and the knowledge assignment function b∗(g) are exponential. People
buy knowledge from more skilled workers (by a fixed additive constant), and
therefore their human capital is below that of their knowledge supplier (by
a fixed multiplicative constant).
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One can define the ”knowledge distance” between two different skill levels
as the number of intervals between them. This is also clearly equal to the
number of generations (or, under our more general interpretation, periods) it
takes for knowledge to be transmitted from the interval of the highest level
to that of the lowest level.
We are now in a position to use the model to characterize the impact of
improvements in information technology. The following proposition charac-
terizes the long-run impact of an improvement in IT, i.e. a fall in s, on the
distribution of income and human capital.
PROPOSITION 3 –Assume ( 9) holds. Consider a reduction in s. Then,
in the long run steady state:
(i) The distribution of human capital shifts up homothetically.
(ii) Inequality as measured by the relative difference in the marginal return
to skill between two consecutive ladders increases.
(iii) gi increases homothetically, implying that each ladder covers a larger
segment of the distribution of skills, that the knowledge distance between any
two types falls or remains constant, and that the number of workers specialized
in output production increases.
(iv) There exists some critical level of s, s+, that if s > s+ then the
wages of all worker types increase.
(v) There exists s− such that if
s ≤ s−, (13)
then at the bottom of each ladder i ≥ 1 there exist worker types who
are displaced from segment i to segment i − 1 (lower knowledge distance
from direct production activity), and whose wages fall. However, they would
eventually benefit from further improvements in information technology.
PROOF — See Appendix.
Proposition 3 analyses the various effects exerted by an improvement in
IT on the long-run distribution of income. These effects are the following.
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More efficient information technologies induce people to buy knowledge from
fewer and better quality suppliers. Thus the ability gap between a supplier
and a consumer of knowledge goes up, so that each knowledge ladder is
wider. Consequently, workers at the bottom of a ladder are displaced to
the previous one. On the other hand, there is a greater willingness to pay
to improve the quality of one’s knowledge supplier, which strengthens the
cumulative effects of knowledge demand on the marginal return to human
capital at a given ladder. In other words, k goes up, so that inequality
among knowledge ladders go up. Finally, as in equilibrium all workers buy
knowledge from more able workers, there is a uniform multiplicative shift to
the distribution of human capital.
Proposition 3 tells us that if IT are initially not too developed, then
in the long run all worker types gain from an improvement in information
technology (Figure 2). The greater ease with which they accumulate human
capital compensates for possible wage losses at a given level of human capital.
This process has limits, however, and for s small enough workers who are
displaced to lower levels in the knowledge chain suffer long-run wage losses
(Figure 3). Whether one gains or loses depends on whether one is displaced
or not, i.e. depends on one’s relative position in one’s segment. As s goes to
zero from s−, all worker types who were originally specialized in knowledge
production experience a marginal wage loss as they cross the boundary to
move to a lower ladder. However, when they are stabilized in the directly
productive activity, their income ends up rising without bound, as IT gives
them access to ever-better knowledge producers.
The first parts of proposition 3 implies that inequality between segments
increases. However, as the knowledge distance between two given types falls,
inequality between individuals need not increase. We can use some approx-
imation to say more about the net effect on inequality. Consider inequality
between two people in the first segment specialized in pure production. Ac-
cording to Proposition 3, their income is simply proportional to eλg
1
1−α . Their
relative wage, expressed in logs, is therefore equal to λ∆g/(1−α), which does
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not depend on s. Thus IT does not affect inequality between two workers in
the bottom segment. Next, consider two knowledge producers belonging to














Assume that our two producers are located at critical points with values
of i large enough for the first term in brackets to be dominated in (14).
Then, given that their rank i can be obtained from their skill level g using
the formula i = −γg/ ln s, the relative log wage of these two workers is
γ(1−lnα/ ln s)∆g. This quantity is clearly increasing when s falls. Therefore,
IT clearly increases inequality at the top of the distribution of income. In
contrast, if one considers say workers originally located in the two bottom
segments, it ends up reducing inequality among these people, as segment 0
gradually absorbs segment 1.16
4 Dynamics
Interestingly, we can also characterize the dynamics of adjustment toward
the steady state, provided we assume that the initial distribution of human
capital among the old is homothetic to that of the long-run steady state.




Let us limit ourselves to the most interesting regime, i.e. regime II. We
can then prove the following:






γ(1−α) − 1), so







and y = ks−
λ
γ(1−α) = α/s. Then look for a solution of the form $i = Ω0 +Ω1yi.
16Interestingly, this is what Mishel and Bernstein (1994) tend to find when looking at
correlations between wage changes and investment in technology.
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PROPOSITION 4 — Assume
s1−
λ







Then there exists an equilibrium path such that
(i) The knowledge assignment function g∗t (g), which gives the skill level
of the (old) agent supplying knowledge to a (young) agent at date t ≥ 0 is
constant and equal to






(ii) There exists a sequence of critical ability levels (g0, g1, ...., gi, ....) such
that at any date t
a. gi = −i/γ ln s, implying g0 = 0.
b. people such that 0 ≤ g ≤ g1 are entirely specialized in the production
of physical output
c. people such that gi ≤ g ≤ gi+1 are entirely specialized in knowledge pro-
duction. They sell knowledge to workers in [gi−1, gi] and buy it from workers
in [gi+1, gi+2]
(iii) The human capital of an old agent with ability g at date t is
bt(g) = Zte
λg/(1−α), (18)











(iv) The knowledge assignment function at t, b∗t (g) is therefore







(v) Over the interval [b(gi), b(gi+1)] wages at date t are given by








and $it can be recursively computed as
$i+1,t = $it + Ωit(bt(gi+1)− bt(gi));
$0t = Ab(0).
PROOF — See Appendix.
One can check that this equilibrium converges indeed to the steady state
derived in the previous subsection. This convergence is gradual and the
knowledge ladders are the same at each date, while the distribution of human
capital converges homothetically to its long-run level. Equation (20), which
gives us the marginal return to human capital in ladder i, is interesting.
It tells us that it is forward looking down into the future up to a number
of periods precisely equal to the knowledge distance between that ladder
and output producers. The marginal return to human capital for output
producers in generation t (ladder 0) is equal to A, it then determines their
demand for knowledge, and thus the marginal return of those who supply
them with knowledge (ladder 1 in generation t−1), which in turn determines
the marginal return to human capital of ladder 2 in generation t − 2, and
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so one. The price of human capital is forward looking, more so when one is
more remote from its ultimate use in the knowledge chain.
This proposition is particularly useful to analyze the dynamic response of
the distribution of income to an improvement in information technology, i.e.
a fall in s, because for any given initial value of s the long-run distribution
of human capital as determined by (10) has the assumed functional form for
Proposition 4 to apply. Furthermore, the initial value of Z, Z0, is given by
B1/(1−α)s−
λα
γ(1−α)2 , which satisfies (17) as long as the initial value of s satisfies
(9). One can then apply proposition 4 to a fall in s, getting the following
results:
PROPOSITION 5 —
(i) The income of the initially old workers who move from segment 1 to
segment 0 is unambiguously lower. Consequently, a reduction in s cannot be
Pareto-improving.
(ii) Along the adjustment path, the distribution of human capital increases
homothetically. That is, Zt is rising along the adjustment path, converging
from below to its new long-run value.
(iii) inequality between two consecutive ladders, as measured by the rel-
ative difference in the marginal return to human capital, falls with time,
converging from above to k as defined by (12)
(iv) That same measure is falling when one moves up the knowledge chain.
PROOF— See Appendix
The first part of Proposition 5 tells us that the impact effect of the im-
provements in information technology hurts some of the old in the initial
generation, namely those who are displaced from ladder 1 to output produc-
tion. It could also potentially hurt some of the old displaced from one ladder
to a lower ladder but who remain specialized in knowledge. Proposition 3 had
shown that in the long run, if s is not too low, even displaced worker types
gain, because their displacement is compensated by a higher level of human
capital. However, this is not true of the initial generation of old workers,
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whose human capital is fixed by their past knowledge acquisition decision,
which took place prior to the improvement in information technology.
Part (iii) and (iv) characterize the dynamics of income distribution along
the adjustment path. Part (iii) implies that inequality overshoots its long-
run level. This is because the improvement in IT boosts the demand for
knowledge supplied by highly capable people, while the supply response (i.e.
the shift in the distribution of b) is only gradual. Part (iv) implies that
such overshooting is weaker when one moves up the knowledge chain. This is
because more skilled workers are at a greater knowledge distance from output
producers, so that their wage reflects the expected marginal return to human
capital of generations more remote in the future (as implied by (20)) . This
quantity is smaller, relative to its long-run value, because human capital is
more abundant, i.e. closer to its long run value, for future generations (as
implied by (ii)).
5 Extensions
In this section we briefly indicate how the model can be extended to make it
more realistic.
5.1 Elastic demand for knowledge
A first aspect is that the demand for knowledge producers is by construction
totally inelastic and always equal to s. As a result a fall in s always reduces
the number of knowledge producers. In practice this may not happen because
as knowledge is cheaper some people who previously did not buy it may start
doing so. Empirically, several studies document the rise in the proportion of
nonproduction workers.17
Therefore, the model’s realism is improved if one introduces some elastic-
ity in the demand for knowledge. To do so, we extend the model by assuming
that workers have the option of not buying it at all, in which case their re-
17See Berman et al. (1994) and other references mentioned in the introduction.
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sulting human capital is Ceλg, where C is a constant. For C high enough
some workers prefer not to buy human capital. One can then show (see Ap-
pendix) that in both regimes I and II, these will be the least able in society,
i.e. workers such that g < g0, where g0 > 0. Furthermore, dg0/ds > 0,
implying that the total number of knowledge consumers increases when IT
improves. Therefore, the net effect on the number of knowledge producers
may be either positive or negative. In regime II, this depends on the sign of
dg1/ds, i.e. on whether the increase in the length of each knowledge segment
is larger or smaller than the fall in g0. We can prove that as long as g0 is
strictly positive, dg1/ds > 0. This implies that the total number of knowledge
producers, i.e. the number of people with ability above g1, actually increases
when s falls, and that rather than having people displaced from the bottom
of ladder 1 to the top of the output producing segment, the reverse occurs.
However, for large enough knowledge distances i from ladder 0, displacement
to the preceding segment does occur, since the effect of the increase in the




, is multiplied by i.
As s becomes small enough, g0 is eventually equal to zero, and the previ-
ous section’s analysis applies: further improvements in IT reduce the num-
ber of knowledge producers and workers at the bottom of each ladder are
displaced to the preceding ladder. The demand for knowledge has become
inelastic as the whole population has been included in the ”knowledge econ-
omy”.18
5.2 Growth
Another possible extension of the model is to introduce exogenous growth
in the total factor productivity parameter A. It is not difficult to extent our
proofs and computations while assuming that A grows at rate x, population
at rate n, and that the interest rate is r. The results must then be modified
18These dynamics are similar to what happens to other new technologies such as con-




1. In proposition 1, the indifference regime now holds for s1−
λ
γ(1−α) ≥
α(1 + x)/(1 + r) and s ≤ α(1 + x)/(1 + r). An increase in TFP growth
























People demand and acquire more human capital when growth is faster.






−i/γ ln [s(1 + n)] . Faster population growth reduces the length of a knowl-
edge segment, i.e. increases the number of segments.19 Furthermore,
k = αs
λ




,implying that when either population or TFP grows more quickly, the

















γ(1−α)2 (1 + n)−α/(1−α), (21)
19We now need to assume s < 1/(1 + n), as the ratio being old and young is 1/(1 + n),
and each young needs to learn from s old.
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implying that TFP growth does not affect the distribution of human
capital, while population growth reduces it homothetically.
These results are not difficult to understand. TFP growth does not affect
the balance between the supply and demand of knowledge in terms of peo-
ple, but makes it more valuable to increase the quality of one’s knowledge
supplier, since it increases the marginal return to human capital tomorrow
relative to its cost today. As a result, the premium to quality increases,
which makes it more likely that some workers entirely specialize in knowl-
edge production and, in that regime, increases inequality between knowledge
segments (i.e., k). In regime I, society acquires more human capital by buy-
ing it from more qualified workers. In regime II, this is not possible as all
high quality workers are already entirely specialized. This attempt is instead
reflected in the wage schedule, which becomes steeper and more convex.
As for population growth, by making the old scarcer, it increases the
demand of knowledge relative to its supply, thus forcing each agent to buy
knowledge from a lower quality supplier. In regime I, this drives people out
of the direct production activity into knowledge production. In regime II, this
increases the number of people who specialize in knowledge while increasing
the number of segments and the marginal willingness to pay for quality..
Thus the resulting distribution of human capital is worsened, while society is
both more segmented and more unequal. These effects of population growth
come from the fact that knowledge is transmitted from old to young, and
would be changed if the timing of knowledge transmission were different.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has developed a theory of the distribution of income, and of the
assignment of workers between output and knowledge production, in a world
where knowledge is a quality good entering as an input in the production of
human capital. The model allows to analyze the effect of an improvement in
information technology, i.e. a reduction in the required working time input
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in the production of human capital, on the distribution of income and the
occupational pattern.
The central result of this paper is that the impact of an improvement in
information technologies on a given worker’s income depends on this worker’s
position relative to his or her ’peer group’ of other workers in the same knowl-
edge ladder. Those who are potentially harmed are found at the bottom of
each ladder, but these are people at intermediate and high income levels.
Workers at the bottom of the distribution of income gain, as they are con-
sumers rather than producers of intangible goods. If this paper message’s
is to be believed, while information technology may have contributed to the
observed overall increase in inequality, one should find other culprits for what




PROOF of Proposition 1 — If ω(b) = Ab throughout, then the young’s
optimization problem is concave and the first-order condition (5) is necessary
and sufficient. It is easy to check that it is equivalent to (7), which proves
(iv). Substituting (7) into (2) proves the first part of (v), while substituting
(8) into the density of g proves its second part. Then, applying (3) yields
(iii).
To complete the proof, we have to show that this is indeed an equilibrium,
i.e. that the supply of old workers in any given interval is actually larger than
the demand for knowledge producers coming from the corresponding young
workers. There are γe−γgdg young workers between g and g + dg. They
buy knowledge from sγe−γgdg old agents. Their ability must lie between






λ . It will be greater than the demand for knowledge







which is clearly equivalent to (6).
Finally, one has to check that b∗(0) ≥ b0, i.e. that the knowledge supplier













Conversely, it is straightforward to check that if all these conditions hold,
one indeed has an equilibrium. Q.E.D.
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PROOF of proposition 2 — Let us start from the knowledge assignment
function in (i) and show that it is supported by a competitive equilibrium
which satisfies (ii)-(v). First, note that in such an equilibrium the supply
of knowledge produced by any type g∗ matches the demand coming from
the corresponding type g. To see this, note that there are γe−γgdg workers
between g and g+dg, and that these workers buy knowledge from s γe−γgdg
suppliers. They buy it from workers between g∗(g) and g∗(g + dg), and
there are γe−γg
∗
g∗0(g)dg such workers. Using the definition of g∗(g) it is
easy to see that this is exactly equal to s γe−γgdg. Thus, all workers above
g∗(0) = g1 = −(ln s)/γ are entirely specialized in knowledge, while those
below g1 produce output.
Next, we show that this allocation of resources is the outcome of indi-
vidual optimization if wages are determined by (v) and if human capital is
related to skills by (iv) (which implies, along with (i), that (iii) holds).





Our first step is to show that b∗(g) satisfies the first-order conditions, i.e.
that it is a local optimum. To see this, first note that if g ∈ [gi, gi+1], then
b∗(g) ∈ [b(gi+1), b(gi+2)]. To satisfy the first-order condition it must maximize
AkiBeλgb∗α − sAki+1b∗, implying that the F.O.C is
αBeλgb∗α−1 − sk = 0 (23)








which, given the definition of k, is equivalent to (iii).
In the special case where g = gi, the objective function is not differen-
tiable, and one has a local optimum if and only if the right-derivative (resp.
left-derivative) is negative (resp. positive) or zero. These two conditions are
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Aki+1αBeλgb∗α−1 − ski+2 ≤ 0,
and
AkiαBeλgb∗α−1 − ski+1 ≥ 0.
Together, these two conditions are equivalent to (23).
Next, we prove that this is a global optimum. Given the convexity of the
wage schedule and its linearity within each interval [b(gi), b(gi+1)] it is clearly
an optimum among all the values of b∗ such that the resulting human capital
of the individual with ability g remains within [b(gi), b(gi+1)]. This is because
over that interval the first term in (22) is linear in its argument, so that the
objective function is concave.
Consider now what happens if individual g tries to get a level of human
capital b̃ in the [b(gi+1), b(gi+2)] interval. Under our assumed knowledge
assignment function, individual gi+1 buys knowledge from individual gi+2,
which gives him a level of human capital equal to b(gi+1).Given that g < gi+1,
in order to get the desired level of human capital, individual g must buy
knowledge from some g0 > gi+2, i.e. from some b0 > b(gi+2). Consequently,
to get a marginal wage equal to Aki+1, individual g must pay a marginal
wage at least equal to Aki+2, i.e. equal to Akm, with m ≥ i+ 2. Given that
b0 > b∗(g), it must be the case that αAki+1Beλgb0α−1 − sAkm < 0 for all b0
such that b̃ ∈ [b(gi+1), b(gi+2)], which implies (by continuity and convexity of
the wage schedule) that the best individual g can do is to pick up b̃ = b(gi+1).
But since b(gi+1) ∈ [b(gi), b(gi+1)] and since b∗(g) maximizes g’s welfare for
the resulting b in [b(gi), b(gi+1)], this clearly generates less utility than picking
b∗(g).
This argument can be extended by induction as follows: to reach some
b̃ in [b(gj+1), b(gj+2)], j ≥ i, individual g must buy human capital from an
agent with human capital greater than b(gj+2), implying that the marginal
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wage he pays is greater than the one he gets by a factor at least as large
as k. This implies again that the optimum in that interval is b̃ = b(gj+1),
which yields a utility no greater than the optimum in the preceding interval
[b(gj), b(gj+1)]. Thus, by induction, all these optima are inferior to the one
where the agent picks b∗(g).
A similar induction argument can be made with respect to vales of b̃ in
inferior intervals.
Therefore, given this knowledge assignment function and this wage sched-
ule, it is indeed optimal for each g to buy knowledge from b∗(g). This in turn
validates (iii) and (iv), while the wage schedule implies the specialization
pattern in (ii). Therefore, we do have an equilibrium. Q.E.D.
PROOF of proposition 3 — (i), (ii), and (iii) follow directly from propo-
sition 2. Let us now prove (iv). Consider a fall in s from sO to sN < sO,
where sN is arbitrarily close to sO. Let us assume (9) holds. To prove that all
worker types gain, we prove that the new critical types gi all gain. Because
the wage schedule is piece-wise linear and convex in eλg/(1−α), it is enough to
prove that its kinks are all above its previous location to prove that it shifts
up everywhere (otherwise convexity would be violated). Thus, we have to
prove that
$iN ≥ $iO +Aki0 [bO(giN)− biO] , (24)
where subscript O (resp. N) refers to variables and functions corresponding
to s = sO (resp. s = sN), and biO = bO(giO). This formula says that the new
wage at kink i must be greater than the wage of the same type in the old
wage schedule (where this type was in the interior of ladder i).
We prove this inequality by induction. First, note that it is trivially
satisfied for i = 0. Next, assume that it is satisfied for i. We would like to
show that it is then satisfied for i+ 1, i.e. that
$i+1,N ≥ $i+1,O +Aki+1O [bO(gi+1,N)− bi+1,O] .
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Using the recursive law (11), we see that this is equivalent to
$iN +Ak
i
N [bi+1,N − biN ] ≥ $iO +AkiO [bi+1,O − biO] +Aki+1O [bO(gi+1,N)− bi+1,O] ,
(25)
If (24) holds, then a sufficient condition for (25) to hold is
AkiN [bi+1,N − biN ] ≥ AkiO [bi+1,O − biO]
+Aki+1O [bO(gi+1,N)− bi+1,O]−Aki0 [bO(giN)− biO]
= AkiO [bi+1,O − bO(giN)] +Aki+1O [bO(gi+1,N)− bi+1,O]
Using the formulae of proposition 2 and assuming that sN = sO(1− µ),





















This will hold for all i ≥ 0 if the term in bracket is always positive as well








Note that (9) implies λ
γ(1−α) < 1, so that the RHS is a linear combination
between s and α. Note also that the LHS is increasing and concave in s, so
that this defines a (possibly empty) interval [s0, s1] , with 0 < s0 < s1 <∞.
20This is done by expressing each new variable as a function of the corresponding old
one, as well as µ, substituting into (25),and ignoring any second-order terms in µ. Thus
we have:
kN ≈ kO(1− µ( λγ(1−α) − 1)),
giN ≈ giO + iµ/γ,
bO(giN ) ≈ biO(1 + λiµγ(1−α) )
biN ≈ biO(1 + λiµγ(1−α) + λαµγ(1−α)2 ),
etc.
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Next, note that for s = α
1
1− λ
γ(1−α) < α it holds since the LHS is equal to α
and the RHS is smaller than α.21 Therefore, s0 < α
1
1− λ
γ(1−α) < s1 and this
inequality holds over some interval of values of s greater than zero but smaller
than the maximum for which (9) holds, α
1
1− λ
γ(1−α) . Let [s+,α
1
1− λ
γ(1−α) ] be such
















, it is always positive as s < 1.




This completes the proof of (iv). Let us now prove (v). We first consider
the wage of agent g1N , who defines the first kink in the new wage schedule.
His wage is simply equal to







His wage prior to the fall in s can be computed using the relevant formula
for ladder 1:



























Comparing this with (27), we see that the wage of this type of worker



























γ(1−α) is the highest possible value of s for which (9) holds.
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Consequently, if this inequality is violated, meaning that sO is too small,
then the wages of this type of agent falls.
To prove that the wages of agents displaced from higher segments also fall
for s small enough, one can just replicate the above proof by induction, in-
verting signs. The preceding condition guarantees that the induction process
can be initiated. It can be unraveled provided the LHS of (26) is negative for
any i. This will work provided s < s+, which guarantees that the first term






γ(1− α)2 ) + s
λ(1− 2α)




γ(1−α) < 1, this always holds provided s is lower than some
s2. Thus (v) holds for s ≤ s− = min(s2, s+, [α(1− α)]
γ(1−α)
γ(1−α)−λ ).
Finally, to prove that wages eventually rise, note that any fixed worker
type g ends up in the directly productive activity as s goes to zero, and that
his human capital b(g) then goes to infinity, as does his wage Ab. Q.E.D.
PROOF of proposition 4 —We want to construct an equilibrium path such
that the segments are constant and equal to their long-run level as determined
by proposition 2. First, note that the knowledge assignment function g∗(g)
realizes equality of supply and demand for each type of knowledge producer
at any date. Furthermore, if it applies, it necessarily implies (ii). What is
the implied evolution of human capital? If at date t it is given by (18), then
using g∗(g) and our human capital production function (2), it is easy to see
that at t + 1 it is determined by (18) with t replaced with t + 1 and Zt+1
as defined by (19). This proves (iii), which trivially implies (iv). Next, note
that if ωt is the wage schedule at t, then a young at date t elects the human











However, under our candidate equilibrium path we have













Given that g belongs to the segment preceding that of g∗(g), one can
check that (28) holds if wages are defined by (v).22 Furthermore, if (10) and
(16) hold, (v) defines a wage schedule which is convex and piece-wise linear.
One can then replicate the induction argument of the proof of proposition
2 to show that such a wage schedule implies that b∗(g) is not only a local
optimum but also a global one. Finally, given that wages in the first segment
are Ab and that they are superior to Ab for higher ladders, this wage schedule
trivially induces the right specialization. Therefore, we have proved that the
assignment function defined in (i) along with the wage schedule defined in
(v) indeed support an equilibrium path along which (ii),(iii) and (iv) are
satisfied. Q.E.D.
NB — To construct the wage schedule using the necessary condition (28)
one can simply work by backward induction starting from the marginal wage
of ladder 0 at an arbitrary time s. It must be equal to A. (28) applied to
t = s − 1 then allows to compute the marginal wage of ladder 1 at s − 1.
Applying it again to t = s − 2 we can then recover the marginal wage of













PROOF of Proposition 5 — To prove (i), just note that the income of a
worker with human capital b in segment 1 is strictly greater than Ab, while it
is exactly equal to Ab if the same worker were in segment 0. Next, note that
the old of the initial generation have their human capital predetermined, so
that they necessarily lose when moving from segment 1 to segment 0.
Next, note that to characterize adjustment dynamics, we can use propo-
sition 4, since for any initial value of s the long-run distribution of b has the
functional form defined by (15). A fall in s implies that Zt rises monotoni-
cally to its new, higher, long-run level along the convergence path. This is an
implication of (19) and (10).23 Thus, we have proved (i) and (ii). Finally, the
relative marginal return to human capital between two consecutive ladders








Given that α < 1 and that Zt increases with t, this is clearly falling with
both t and i, thus proving (iii) and (iv). Q.E.D.
II. EXTENSION
Elastic demand for knowledge
We assume that if someone does not buy knowledge his human capital is
b = Ceλg. It is then not difficult to check that one can construct equilibria
similar to the ones derived in propositions 1 and 2 by simply translating them
to the right by a distance g0 on the g axis, while constructing g0 such that
people with g < g0 do not buy knowledge, with g0 being indifferent.
In regime I, the welfare of an agent g who buys knowledge from an agent
















γ(1−α)2 , which is clearly falling with s.
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1−α (1− α) ≤ Ceλg











(1− α)B 11−αα α1−α
i´
This may be positive if C large enough and s not too small, and it is
clearly increasing in s.
One technical detail is that it may not be feasible to buy knowledge
from an agent with b = b∗(g) because there is a hole in the distribution of
b as one passes the g0 threshold: b(g) jumps at g = g0. However this is
not true for g smaller than but close enough to g0, since the assumption
α ≥ s implies b∗(g) > b(g). So the formula determining the indifference
threshold g0 is correct, since people around that level can actually buy their
preferred knowledge level b∗(g). The only people who could not do so are
those for whom g is low enough relative to g0. But this further reduces their
value of buying knowledge, which is lower than Ceλg anyway. So taking into
account this difficulty does not alter our conclusions. To prove that we have
constructed an equilibrium, just reproduce the proof of prop. 1.
In regime II, we can construct a similar translated equilibrium, with
g∗(g) = g − (ln s)/γ for g ≥ g0, gi = g0 − i(ln s)/γ, and where agents with
ability g < g0 do not buy knowledge. Since people just at the right of g0
would buy knowledge from people just at the bottom of segment 1, a worker
with g = g0 exactly would buy knowledge from g = g1 exactly. Hence for
g < g0 one would purchase knowledge from agents below g1, so that the cost
of knowledge is sAb∗. We construct g0 so that it is indifferent about buying
knowledge, which is equivalent to




γ(1−α)2 − s1− λγ(1−α)2 ) (29)
= ACeλg0
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To prove that all workers with g > g0 prefer to acquire knowledge, we
show that du/dg is greater under knowledge acquisition for any g > g0.24 If
this is true, then, as type g0 is indifferent, by integration u(g) will be greater
under knowledge acquisition for all g > g0. This condition is equivalent to
ω0(b(g))b0(g)− sω0(b∗(g))b∗0(g) > λACeλg









γ(1−α)2 − ks1− λγ(1−α)2
i
> (1− α)C












1−α − (1− α)eαλg01−α .
Plugging in the definition of k and rearranging we get that this is equiv-
alent to
ki+1eλα(g−g0)/(1−α) > k − α,
which is trivially true given that k > 1 and g > g0.
Next, we prove that workers with g < g0 prefer not to acquire knowledge.
Clearly, they will not acquire more knowledge than type g0, i.e. they would
buy knowledge from somebody with human capital b < b∗(g0) = b(g1). Thus
they will prefer not to acquire knowledge if for all such b we have
Beλgbα − sb < Ceλg (30)
24It is enough to prove that in all the points where u is differentiable, since u is continuous
and is not differentiable only for a countable set of isolated points.
25More precisely, using the properties of the translated equilibrium we are constructing,
which are the same as in proposition 2, up to a translation by a distance 1/γ ln(1/ē).
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Assume that b̃(g) < b∗(g0). Then the maximum feasible value of the LHS







1−αα −B 11−α eλg/(1−α)s−α/(1−α) (α) 11−α .






1−α (1− α) < s− λαγ(1−α)2 − s1− λγ(1−α)2 . (32)
Furthermore, using (31) and the formulas of proposition 2, we see that














which is true since (9) holds.
Next, consider the case where b̃(g) > b∗(g0). Then the maximum feasible







γ(1−α)2 − e λg01−αs1− λγ(1−α)2 )






1−α (eλg0 − eλg),
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which always holds since g0 > g.
This completes the determination of g0 and the proof that people buy
knowledge if and only if g ≥ g0. To complete the construction of the equilib-
rium, one simply uses the same steps as in the proof of proposition 2 where
g0 is no longer necessarily equal to zero.
Finally, note that for C > 0, (29) defines a value of g0 which is falling
when s falls and eventually becomes negative, in which case we are in the
regime of proposition 2.
To determine whether g1 rises or falls with s, we differentiate the following
expression, using (29):
























γ(1−α)2 − s1− λγ(1−α)2
.
Rearranging we see that we have dg1/ds ≥ 0 if and only if
αs
λ





This is true given that in regime II the LHS is greater than 1 and that
γ > λ, which in turn implies that the RHS is less than one. This proves the
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